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A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE "TRUTH
IN NEGOTIATING LAW"
Robert C. Gusmant
The Truth In Negotiating Law requires contractors under prime
and subcontracts with the federal government to submit cost or pricing
data prior to award of prime and subcontracts exceeding $100,000 and
prior to the pricing of any contract change exceeding $100,000. The
contractor, under these circumstances, is required to certify that, to the
best of his knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing data submitted
was accurate, complete and current. Prime contracts, including changes
under which such a certificate is required, must contain a provision
that the price shall be adjusted to exclude any significant sums found
by the head of the government agency to have resulted from inaccurate,
incomplete, or noncurrent data.1
t Member of the New York, District of Columbia, and California Bars. B.A. 1953,
New York University; LL.B. 1956, Cornell Law School. Assistant General Counsel, Aerojet-
General Corporation. The views expressed herein are the author's and not those of any
organization.
1 10 U.S.C.A. § 2306(f) (Supp. 1969) provides:
(f) A prime contractor or any subcontractor shall be required to submit
cost or pricing data under the circumstances listed below, and shall be required
to certify that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing data
he submitted was accurate, complete and current-
(1) Prior to the award of any negotiated prime contract under this title where
the price is expected to exceed $100,000;
(2) Prior to the pricing of any contract change or modification for which
the price adjustment is expected to exceed $100,000, or such lesser amount as
may be prescribed by the head of the agency;
(3) Prior to the award of a subcontract at any tier, where the prime
contractor and each higher tier subcontractor have been required to furnish such
a certificate, if the price of such subcontract is expected to exceed $100,000; or
(4) Prior to the pricing of any contract change or modification to a sub-
contract covered by (3) above, for which the price adjustment is expected to
exceed $100,000, or such lesser amount as may be prescribed by the head of the
agency.
Any prime contract or change or modification thereto under which such cer-
tificate is required shall contain a provision that the price to the Government,
including profit or fee, shall be adjusted to exclude any significant sums by which
it may be determined by the head of the agency that such price was increased
because the contractor or any subcontractor required to furnish such a certificate,
furnished cost or pricing data which, as of a date agreed upon between the parties
(which date shall be as close to the date of agreement on the negotiated price as
is practicable), was inaccurate, incomplete, or noncurrent: Provided, That the
requirements of this subsection need not be applied to contracts or subcontracts
where the price negotiated is based on adequate price competition, established
catalog or market prices of commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the
general public, prices set by law or regulation or, in exceptional cases where the
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Although the Act, on its surface, presents an open and deceptively
simple statutory scheme, it has a surprisingly cube-like effect. Clasped
within the statutory palm are the concepts of disclosure, cost and price
analysis, profit limitation and misrepresentation. It is primarily directed
to the problem of assuring reasonable prices for items procured where
there is neither adequate price competition nor the safeguards which
normally flow from economic forces at work in a truly competitive
market.2 It recognizes that where prices cannot be validated either by
adequate price competition or by reference to established prices result-
ing from a competitive market, fair contract prices can nevertheless be
arrived at by honest and open negotiations in which the contractor
reveals his cost or pricing data to be accurate, current or complete.3
The Act assumes that cost or pricing data are not within the govern-
ment's knowledge, thus placing upon the contractor the disclosure
requirement.4 Having secured cost or pricing data, pursuant to the
contractor's pricing certificate, the Act's second side implicitly com-
mands the performance by the government of cost and price analysis
and negotiation to determine a fair price.5 This technique involves a
head of the agency determines that the requirements of this subsection may be
waived and states in writing his reasons for such determination.
For the purpose of evaluating the accuracy, completeness, and currency of
cost or pricing data required to be submitted by this subsection, any authorized
representative of the head of the agency who is an employee of the United
States Government shall have the right, until the expiration of three years after
final payment under the contract or subcontract, to examine all books, records,
documents, and other data of the contractor or subcontractor related to the
negotiation, pricing, or performance of the contract or subcontract.
See OFFicE OF GEN. COUNSEL OF DEP'T OF NAVY, NAvY CoNMAcr LAw § 9.17A, at 183-87
(2d ed. Supp. 1965) for the legislative history of the Act. Roback, Truth in Negotiating:
The Legislative Background of P.L. 87-653, 1 PUB. CoNmAcr L.J. 3, 5 (1968), describes the
pre-Act overcharge problems that led to its enactment.
2 See S. EP. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962). See generally Roback, supra
note 1, at 7, 24.
3 Hearings Before the House Comm. on Armed Services on HR. 5532, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 15-16, 57 (1962).
4 SUBCOMM. FOR SPECIAL INVEsTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ARMD SERvicEs, 90TH
CONG., 2D SEss., REVIEW OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND PRACTICES,
pt. 1, at 1 (Comm. Print 1968). See generally Hearings on Economy in Government Procure-
ment and Property Management Before the Subcomm. on Econ. in the Govt. of the Joint
Econ. Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); Hearings on Defense Contract Audit Agency
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967) [hereinafter Defense Contract Audit Hearings]; Hearings on Defense Procurement
Policies, Procedures and Practices Before the Subcomm. for Special Investigations of the
House Comm. on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1967).
S See Armed Services Procurement Regulations, 32 C..R. § 3.807-2 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as ASPR]. The regulations are issued under the authority of the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2814 (1964). They govern procurement policies
of the Department of Defense. See generally Nash, Pricing Policies in Government Con-
tracts, 29 LAw & CONmMP. PROB. 361 (1964).
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detailed examination of the estimated cost of performance of the job,
the negotiation of this estimated cost and the addition to such cost of
a profit which the parties believe to be a fair reward for the work
under contract. The Act, however, in practical effect, adds to the
government's arsenal of remedies an effective means to recapture profits
which it considers to be unearned.6 Significantly, the government may
assert its claim during contract performance or after the work's com-
pletion. For the purposes of government contracts, it converts fixed-
price type contracts into redeterminable contracts, thus permitting
a downward adjustment of price, whenever the government so de-
termines.7 The Act's fourth side, through its certification machinery,
converts what otherwise would have been a matter of judgment into
a representation. Prices of most government procurement contracts
are based largely on estimated costs in proposals submitted by con-
tractors as a basis for negotiation.8 Under the statutory terms the cost
6 Statement of Congressman F. Edw. Hebert on H.R. 5532, reprinted in Hearings,
supra note 3, at 54-60. Congressman Hebert states, "This bill will prevent an unearned
bonus profit from being paid, or advanced on padded estimates." Id. at 57. See also
SENATE COMM. ON ARmED SERvIcEs REP. ON PROCUREMENT, S. REP. No. 1900, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 28 (1960). Cf. Hannah, Bond & Virden, The Contractor Looks at the "Truth in
Negotiations Act," 1 PUB. CoNTRACr L.J. 38, 45 (1968).
7 A price redeterminable contract may be either prospective or retroactive. If the
former, it provides "for a firm fixed price for an initial period of contract deliveries or
performance and for prospective price redetermination either upward or downward at a
stated time or times during the performance of the contract." ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.404-5(a)
(1968) (prospective price redetermination at a stated time or times during performance).
This type of contract is used in procurements calling for quantity production or services;
fair and reasonable prices may be negotiated for an initial period but not for later periods
of performance. Id. § 3.404-5(b). If retroactive, there is provision "for a ceiling price and
retroactive price redetermination after completion of the contract." Id. § 3404-7(a) (retro-
active price redetermination after completion). The retroactive contract is used when it
is impossible to establish fair and reasonable prices at the time of negotiation and the
amount involved is so small or the time for performance is so short that use of any other
contract is impractical.
The regulations provide for three basic contracts: cost-plus, fixed-price, and incentive.
The cost-plus contract is used primarily for purchasing new or untried services and for
which there is little available cost data. The contractor is reimbursed for all his costs
plus a fixed profit or fee. The Defense Department uses this type infrequently, as there
is little incentive for contractor efficiency. Id. § 3.405-5. Most preferred are fixed-price
contracts, particularly firm fixed-price contracts. These are negotiated at a specific price
to be paid even if the contractor's costs exceed the contract price. Id. § 3.04-2. The
incentive contract is a hybrid; it encourages efficiency in procurement situations where
cost data are insufficient to arrive at a firm fixed price but sufficient to avoid the cost-plus
contract. It includes a negotiated target cost and an incentive-sharing formula. The
government and contractor split any difference between actual cost and target cost in
proportion to an incentive-sharing ratio.
8 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807 (1968). See generally Nash, supra note 5. It should be em-
phasized that a contractor is estimating what the contract will cost. The Act converts his
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or pricing data supporting these estimates are represented to be ac-
curate, current or complete. The pricing certificate thus becomes a
contractual affirmation of matters that are normally judged to be
opinions; breach of this certification is equivalent to misrepresenting
cost or pricing data.
The Truth In Negotiating Law undoubtedly is part of a trend in
which the failure to disclose matters ordinarily not regarded as fact is
now classified as a breach of legal duty.9 Truth-telling carries a sweet
lure in these days of complex and vast government transactions. The
Truth In Negotiating Law is, however, an imperfect model. Despite
the simplicity of its objectives and the statutory machinery for price
certification and price adjustment, the Act is uneven in quality. Its
lack of precision regrettably permits subjective choices as to the mean-
ing of misrepresentation, cost or pricing data, disclosure, and overstate-
ment. And the recognition that the government is not an unwary
consumer, 10 but has vast powers available to it in the procurement
process," makes the Act's credentials suspect.
estimate into actual cost or pricing data. This point is frequently overlooked in discus-
sions of the Act. See Note, The Truth-In-Negotiations Act-An Examination of Defec-
tive Pricing in Government Contracts, 54 VA. L. Rnv. 505, 509 (1968).
9 See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 288 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-81n
(1964) requiring those who make "take over" bids for the equity securities of a
corporation to disclose the terms and underlying facts; and the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act, with its truth in lending provision. 82 Stat. 146, § 124 (May 29, 1968). See also
Los Angeles Times, July 30, 1968, Part III, at 8; N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1968, § 3, at 1,
col. 2; Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1968, at 3, col. 1 (Pacific Coast ed.).
10 New York v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (applica-
tion of UNFORx CoarmEacuAL CODE § 2-802 to protect the gullible consumer from
excessive appliance prices).
11 Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry, 41 VA.
L. REv. 27, 57 (1955) emphasizes the unequal bargaining positions of the government and
contractor:
To a large extent, accordingly, the Government contract is an instrument
of a power relationship, and only vaguely resembles the consensual agreement
extolled by Maine and relied upon by Adam Smith. The significant decision is
that of the Government in setting the terms and conditions of the proposed
agreement. Little is left to the give-and-take of bargaining. The decision of the
contractor is that of accepting the conditions imposed, or of not accepting them
and giving up the contract entirely. Change them, bargain over them, he cannot.
It is precisely because Government contracts do reflect a power relationship,
and not a consensual agreement between equals, that mandatory conditions may
be attached to them. Social control would not be possible if left to the vagaries of
the bargaining table and the higgling of the marketplace. The norm (or myth)
calls for an exchange of offer and acceptance, with the accepting party not ex-
pressing assent in the abstract, but indicating his willingness to be bound by
the precise terms contained in the offer. The act of the business firm awarded a
Government contract is, to a large extent, an act of submission. Not that the law




THE DEPARTURE FROM TRADITIONAL RULES
Under ordinary contract law doctrine, nondisclosure of material
information may be considered a misrepresentation. 12 If one party to
a contract has superior knowledge or knowledge which is not within
the reasonable reach of the other, and if such information cannot be
diligently discovered, the party possessing the information is under a
legal obligation to speak. His silence constitutes a misrepresentation,
especially when the other party relies upon him to communicate to
him the true state of facts to enable him to judge the wisdom of the
bargain.13 So, too, there is practically universal agreement that, if the
material mistake of one party was caused by the other, either pur-
posely or innocently, or was known to him, or was of such character
is maintained, both in "compulsory" agreements and in Government contracts.
The process forces obedience on all who approach its sphere of activity, but the
law makes no differentiation between the offer which results in free bargaining
and the offer which results in a form of economic coercion.
The contractor's system of inspection and quality control are subject to government
approval, ASPR, 32 C.F.R. §§ 14.101-1 to -3 (1968); the government has the right to
inspect the plant and audit the contractor's books and records, 10 U.S.C. § 2313 (1964);
the government has reserved the right, in certain cases, to approve the contractor's sub-
contracts, including its purchasing system and make-or-buy plan, ASPR, 32 C.F.R. §§ 3.901
to .902-5 & 23.000 to .204 (1968); the government has established the cost principles
applicable to government work, id. §§ 15.000 to .603 (1968); the regulations are not sub-
ject to the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964); and profit control is
limited by the Renegotiation Act of 1951, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1211-33 (1964). See also the De-
fense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2166 (1964).
12 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 472 (1932).
"13 Id. Judge Hincks, in Bank & Trading Corp. v. Floete, 257 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1958),
applied the Restatement rule in a case involving the superior knowledge of the govern-
ment with respect to export regulations:
I not only concur in Judge WATERMAN'S opinion but would also base
affirmance on the ground that even if a valid contract had been made the
contract had been rescinded for the reasons stated in Judge Walsh's lucid opinion
below. 147 F. Supp. 193, at pages 207 and 208. On February 3, 1947 when
Isbrandtsen wrote its "offer" to RDC both parties were mistaken as to the state
of the Netherlands export regulations. For Isbrandtsen was not informed of
the "new" regulations until February 4 and RDC not until February 17. Conse-
quently if RDC's reply of February 7th be deemed an acceptance which brought
a contract into effect, there was a mutual mistake as to a fact plainly material
and the contract was voidable under the Restatement of Contracts § 502. If,
however, a contract be deemed to have come into effect when Isbrandtsen accepted
the counteroffer contained in RDC's letter of February 7, Isbrandtsen's continued
failure to disclose to RDC the new Netherlands export regulations was not privi-
leged under § 472(i)(b) of the Restatement and consequently its non-disclosure
had the effect of a material misrepresentation under § 472(2). As such it was
cause for rescission under § 476(1) of the Restatement. See Corbin on Contracts,
Vol. 3, § 610.
257 F.2d at 770-71.
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that he had reason to know of it, the mistaken party has a right to
rescind the contract.14
A party entering into a bargain is not bound to tell everything
he knows to the other, even if he is aware that the other is ignorant of
the facts; and unilateral mistake, of itself, does not make a transaction
voidable. But if a fact known by one party and not the other is so
vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable,
and the party knowing the facts also knows that the other does not
know it, nondisclosure is not privileged.15 On the one hand the law
recognizes a remedy where one of the contracting parties has superior
knowledge. The possession of that information places him under a duty
of disclosure. And the breach of that duty may render him liable for
misrepresentation. On the other hand the law recognizes that where
one of the contracting parties may have erred and this mistake was
caused by the other contracting party or was known to him, the contract
may be rescinded.
The Truth In Negotiating Law leaps over the possible impedi-
ments that surround common law misrepresentation and mistake by
establishing, through the guise of the pricing certificate, a contract
requirement that the contractor has furnished cost or pricing data that
is accurate, current and complete. The failure to satisfy the certificate
entitles the government to a downward price adjustment because the
contractor furnished unsuitable data. So, too, the Act enlarges upon
the common law by predetermining the questions of superior knowl-
edge, mistake, and the materiality of the omitted cost or pricing data.
Under common law doctrines these are matters that must be proved.
But whatever cost or pricing data may actually be, the Act has been
interpreted as a decree that they are facts relied upon as the basis for
the establishment of the contract price.
Ironically, the best illustrations of the common law at work are
found in the field of government contracts where the contractor has
brought suit against the government based upon the nondisclosure of
material information. These cases hold that the government is under
a duty to divulge to its contractors any information of a material nature
in its possession concerning a proposed project or procurement which
may deter the contractor from undertaking to bid or which will alert
him to circumstances which may affect the amount of his bid. They
underline the notion that the Truth In Negotiating Law lacks sound




common law roots and sharpens the discrepancies between the parties'
positions.
In the leading case of Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. United
States,16 plaintiff's suit was for additional costs based on its claim that
the Army knew of the need for grinding powder required for the man-
ufacture of a disinfectant. Plaintiff neither had nor had reason to
have this information; the Army failed to supply the information to
plaintiff in the specification or elsewhere, and this failure misled
plaintiff. In the alternative, plaintiff claimed that the specification was
affirmatively misleading as to the method of making the disinfectant.
The court found that the Army knew that grinding powder would be
necessary, since the product contracted for could not be made without
it; that plaintiff, on the basis of the information available to it, reason-
ably expected to perform the contract by simple mixing without grind-
ing; that the Army was aware that plaintiff expected to produce the
product improperly without grinding; and that the Army did not in-
form the contractor of the proper method of manufacture. The specifi-
cation itself was viewed by the court to be "actively misleading" in
the context of the special knowledge the government possessed but did
not share. As to the government's obligation, the court said:
Although it is not a fiduciary toward its contractors, the Govern-
ment-where the balance of knowledge is so clearly on its side-can
no more betray a contractor into a ruinous course of action by
silence than by the written or spoken word.' 7
The Court of Claims in J. A. Jones Construction Co. v. United
States's allowed plaintiff-contractor to recover $122,897.21 for premium
(overtime) wages paid by it and its subcontractors. The gravamen of the
complaint was that the government knew but failed to divulge that a
large, high priority ICBM construction program, premised in large
part on the payment of premium wages, was to be initiated in the labor
area where plaintiff's contract was to be performed. The resulting
labor shortage forced plaintiff to pay premium wages in order to ac-
quire the labor necessary for contract performance, although after due
inquiry it had reasonably prepared its bid on the assumption that an
adequate supply of straight-time labor would be available.
In Snyder-Lynch Motors, Inc. v. United States,19 plaintiff brought
16 312 F.2d 774 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
17 Id. at 778.
18 390 F.2d 886 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
39 292 F.2d 907 (Ct. Cl. 1961). To similar effect are Blackhawk Hotels Co., 68-2 BOA
33,756 (1968); Midvale-Heppenstall Co., 65-1 BCA 22,107 (1964); Johnson Electronics, Inc.,
65-1 BCA 22,099 (1964).
[Vol. 54:708.
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an action against defendant to recover damages resulting from the losses
it sustained in carrying out a contract to rebuild 750 tank engines.
Prior to submitting its bid, plaintiff requested a specimen engine that
could be torn down and rebuilt for a practical test of the time and labor
involved. The government knew from another company's experience
that the cost of replacement parts was 145.5 per cent above the esti-
mated cost, although that information was not disclosed. The court
held that the government was wrong in not revealing this information
and allowed the plaintiff to recover the resulting damages.
The prerequisites to liability are the government's superior knowl-
edge and the probable consequences flowing from withholding that
information, the lack of knowledge by the contractor, and the fact that
the government should have been aware of the contractor's ignorance,
but nevertheless failed to disclose the pertinent information. The
critical fact in each of these cases is the contractor's entrapment, without
warning, in a situation beyond his control.20
The Truth In Negotiating Law embraces the theories of these
cases, but overlooks the conditions they considered necessary to attach
liability. The Act establishes the presumption that the contractor is in
possession of cost or pricing data not known to the government because
the data originates within his organization. It requires that this data be
furnished by the contractor, even though the government may have
access to this or similar data. It assumes that, when cost or pricing data
is not furnished to the government, the government has established a
contract price based upon a mistake. Thus the contractor, upon price
adjustment, is merely giving back to the government what is due, ac-
cording to the Act's theory.
The remedies for misrepresentation and mistake were not con-
sidered available to the government with respect to the overcharges
reported by the General Accounting Office prior to the Act's passage.
In the absence of legal remedies, the government had employed the
voluntary refund device relying upon principles of fair dealing to
achieve its desired adjustment.21 The use of the voluntary refund
procedure suggests that the contractor's cost proposals were not repre-
20 Air-A-Plane Corp. v. United States, No. 61-62 (Ct. Cl. July 24, 1968). The court's
words at page 12 are instructive:
The vice of the alleged misrepresentation here is not that there were extensive
changes, but that for reasons of its own the Government elected not to warn the
bidders, for had it done so the bidders could not later have claimed surprise.
Fundamental fairness imposes a duty on the Government to make full disclosure
to bidders to give them the opportunity of refusal. Judicial rebuke of the oc-
casional lapse provides a wholesome catharsis.
21 See note 13 supra.
1969]
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sentations of facts to be relied on by the government negotiators. The
strength of the government's purchasing power, its ability to audit con-
tractor's records, and its internal estimating procedures provided
reasonable safeguards against entering into contracts under a mistake
of fact which was known or should have been known by the contractor.
Yet by overtaking the common law requirements to avoid or
reform a contract, the Act establishes an imbalance in the law of
contracts. Aside from the obvious argument relating to the stability of
contract, it establishes one set of rules for the government concerning
price adjustment, while contractors are left to pursue strict legal reme-
dies before the courts with the requirement that their claims conform
to standards of proof and satisfy conditions not present in the Act.22
II
TiH GovERNMEaNT'S CASE
A. The Relationship Between the Pricing Certificate and the Price
Reduction Clause
The crux of the Act is the pricing certificate requirement and
the price adjustment provision. The regulation implementing the
Act ties these clauses by establishing the condition that the price
reduction is dependent upon the finding that incomplete or inaccurate
cost or pricing data or data not current "as certified in the Contractor's
Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data" has occurred.28 At the
outset, the interesting question is posed as to the appropriate standards
of interpretation. If defective pricing is a matter governed by the Act,
then the general rules of statutory construction should control. But
in this instance there are two conflicting rules: First, that statutes in
derogation of the common law should be strictly construed;2 4 and
second, that remedial statutes should be read liberally.25 The Act
creates a misrepresentation or a breach of contract that does not exist
at common law and thus offends the basic notions about stability of
contracts. Yet it is also a remedial statute, attempting to correct an
imperfection in the procurement process whereby overcharging in
22 But see Pettfit & Joseph, Government's Obligation To Disclose Under the Truth
In Negotiations Act, 10 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 18 (1968).
23 ASPR, 82 C.F.R. § 7.104-29 (1968).
24 Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 516, 523 (1955).
25 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431 (1939); Grand Trunk Ry. v.
Richardson, 91 U.S. 454, 472 (1875).
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government contracts could result if unsuitable cost or pricing data
was employed by the government negotiators.
If, however, the question of defective pricing is a matter of con-
tract construction, there are equally difficult standards. The imbalance
here results from dealing with a contract of adhesion in which there
has been no bargaining over the contract terms relating to the pricing
certificate and the price reduction clause.26 At the same time that the
parties are caught in the white heat of a negotiation, which thrives on
instinct, experience and common sense, the Act requires an almost
perfect disclosure of data from what in most cases must be complex
and widely scattered organizations.2 7
Although no sure standard of interpretation can be presented at
this time, proper results probably can be achieved by weighing the
remedial policy of the Act against two other factors: the conduct of
the parties and the contractual or commercial setting in which the
parties deal. The Act should be considered subordinate to its con-
tractual counterparts (the pricing certificate and the price reduction
clause), so that the rules applicable to contractual relationships apply.
This conclusion was probably intended by Congressman Vinson when
he indicated that the legislative purpose underlying the inclusion of
the certificate in the Act was to make the contract invalid unless the
certificate was obtained, pursuant to the statutory direction.28 Any
other result may mean that the statute has imposed upon contractors
an insurer's liability-strict liability upon finding any omitted data.
This notion is buttressed by the government's establishment of a con-
tractual relationship by the terms of the pricing certificate and the
26 For discussions of contracts of adhesion and compulsory government contracts, see
Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917); Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLuM. L. REv. 629 (1943);
Lenhoff, The Scope of Compulsory Contracts Proper, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 586 (1943);
Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 731 (1943); Pound,
The New Feudalism, 16 A.B.AJ. 553 (1930); Note, 30 IND. L.J. 60 (1954).
27 Hearings, supra note 3, at 43-44.
28 108 CONG. R C. 9972 (1962) (remarks of Congressman Vinson):
That requirement is set out in [ASPR] section 3-807.3 and the form of the
certificate is prescribed in [ASPR] section 3-807.7.
I submit that if it is good regulation, it will be good law.
The reason for putting this provision in the law is to have the require-
ment followed.
When it is law, no contract will be enforcible [sic] without it. That is the
point to which we have come today.
(Emphasis added.) A statutory scheme with similar effect is contained in 10 U.S.C.
§ 2313(b) (1964).
1969]
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price reduction clause.29 Accordingly, the rules applicable to contracts
of adhesion should apply.80
One of the basic doctrines in government contracts is that when
the government enters into contracts, it is on the same footing as any
other contracting party and is bound by the traditional rules governing
the formation and construction of contracts-it is bound by its con-
tracts to the same extent as a private person.8 1 A universal rule of
contract construction is that other writings which are referred to in a
written contract are regarded as incorporated by reference into the
contract and, therefore, should be considered in the interpretation of
the contract.32 The price reduction clause operates on the furnishing
of incomplete pricing data and refers to the pricing certificate to deter-
mine this deficiency.8 Thus the relationship between the pricing cer-
tificate and the price reduction clause is clear. The clause incorporates
by reference the certificate as the means of establishing the data and
the period to which it applies.8 4 Stated differently, as a matter of con-
tract, the government's right of price reduction under the price reduc-
tion clause is derived solely from and is limited by the contractor's
certification of pricing data, as contained in the pricing certificate. 35
29 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7.104-29 (1968).
30 Pasley, The Interpretation of Government Contracts: A Plea for Better Understand-
ing, 25 FORHAM L. REv. 211, 213-15 (1956).
31 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934); Hollerbach v. United States, 233
U.S. 165, 171 (1914); Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 396 (1875).
32 Day v. United States, 245 US. 159 (1917).
33 See p. 721 & note 41 infra.
34 Mr. Shedd, speaking for the Board in American Bosch Arma in outlining the sig-
nificant differences between the ASPR provision before and after passage of the Truth In
Negotiating Act, concluded that the price reduction clause must be read with the pricing
certificate and that "the only contractual duty to furnish pricing data is such as can be
implied from the contractor's obligations under the Price Reduction . . . clause in con-
junction with the Certificate of Current Pricing Data." 65-2 BCA 24,838, at 24,849 (1965).
35 See also 8 CCH Gov'T CONT. REP. 90,062, at 95,172 (1967). Cuneo, Ackerly &
Lane, Truth In Negotiations-Part II (Briefing Paper No. 68-4, Aug. 1968), while agreeing
with the conclusion, state:
What is your responsibility in the absence of a certificate? The current price
reduction clauses are unclear. They provide for a price reduction if the price was
inflated because the contractor "furnished incomplete or inaccurate cost or pricing
data or data not current as certified in the Contractor's Certificate of Current Cost
or Pricing Data." Technically, then, your liability for inaccuracy or incomplete-
ness does not hinge on the certificate, but your liability for noncurrency does.
Id. at 4 (footnote omitted).
This construction is rejected by the authors and may not be accurate, since the
quoted portion of the clause, as set forth in ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7.104-29 (1968), is bracketed
by commas; hence, the "as certified" language modifies the entire expression. This result
is supported by id. § 3.807-5(a), as amended by Defense Procurement Circ. No. 57
(Nov. 30, 1967). However, in cases dealing with the prestatutory clause, the Board con-
cluded that the certificate and the price adjustment clause were independent. Lockheed
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B. The Government's Position
The government, under the view adopted by the Board,36 has the
burden of proving
(1) that the cost or pricing data furnished were inaccurate, in-
complete or noncurrent;
(2) that the price increase was caused by the defect; and
(3) the amount of the increase.37
Although there must be a cause and effect relationship between the
nondisclosure of cost or pricing data and the overstated price, the Board
has not bound itself to a direct causation test but has applied a "natural
and probable" test or a "reasonable probability" test. The cumulative
effect of this test has been to erode the causation requirement expressly
stated in the Act and to limit the government's burden of proof es-
tablished by previous Board opinions.
American Bosch Arma Corp.8 established the "natural and prob-
able" causation test. It involved a fixed-price incentive "follow-on"
contract for missile guidance sets under which the government claimed
that the target cost of $14.08 million included an overstatement of
$184,831, because the contractor failed to furnish current cost or pricing
data relative to seventy-five purchased parts. The contractor had ac-
cumulated and was continuing to accumulate substantial historical
production data for these sets, including evidence of progressive de-
creases in material costs. The government's requirement was increased
during various stages of negotiations from a quantity of two to sixty-
four; and the contractor submitted three separate cost estimates and
cost breakdowns for incremental quantities. The second of these, which
constituted the principal increment of the contractor's proposal, was
Aircraft Corp., 67-1 BCA 29,439 (1967); American Bosch Arma Corp., 65-2 BCA 24,838
(1965). The present clause dictates another result. One commentator has concluded that
the certificate "is of minimal utility." Note, supra note 8, at 513. His analysis seems to
be based on the prestatutory cases and overlooks Congressman Vinson's statement set
forth in note 28 supra.
36 The Board sits as the authorized representative of the Secretary of the Defense
Department, pursuant to the contract's "disputes" clause. ASPR, 82 C.F.R. § 7.103-12 (1968).
Its rules of procedure and charter are set forth at id. § 80.1 App. A (1968). Its proceedings
are quasi-judicial; decisions lack finality on questions of law. 41 US.C. §§ 321-22 (1964).
See generally Hiestand & Parler, The Disputes Procedure Under Government Contracts:
The Role of the Appeals Boards and the Courts, 8 B.C. IND. & Comr. L. REv. (1966);
Note, Government Contracts Disputes: An Institutional Approach, 73 YALE L.J. 1408
(1964).
37 Northrop Corp., 69-1 BCA 34,544, at 34,548 (1968); Defense Electronics, 66-1 BCA
26,191, at 26,201-02, motion for reconsideration denied, 66-1 BCA 26,426 (1966).
38 65-2 BOA 24,838 (1965).
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for a total of forty-nine sets; and it included the contractor's "make or
buy" structure and historical costs showing prices and quotations on
the seventy-five purchased parts. A period of about four months
elapsed from the submission of the principal increment of the contrac-
tor's proposal until conclusion of negotiations and execution of the
contractor's certification of the cost or pricing data. At the time of the
conference to conclude negotiation of target cost, the contractor had
a breakdown of the cost elements constituting target cost, but this was
not disclosed. The contractor also made a breakdown of the negotiated
price which estimated the materials cost at $73,280 less than it would
have been if based on the principal increment of the contractor's
proposal.
The Board found that the contractor had cost experience data as
to the seventy-five purchased parts more recent than that submitted
with the principal increment of its proposal, and that the data was
posted in its records and otherwise "reasonably available" to it for a
period of two and a half months subsequent to the pricing proposal.
On the basis of the limited evidence in the record, however, the Board
found that the contractor did not have more recent cost or pricing data
reasonably available (considering such matters as administrative time
for posting records) during the remaining six weeks immediately prior
to the execution of the certificate. The Board therefore found that the
contractor was required to furnish the government the additional data
available to it during the two and a half months' period but not the
data which did not become available until the final six weeks' period.
The Board did find that additional pricing data showing reductions of
$20,746 in the prices of purchased parts (data which became available
to the contractor during the government audit and during the two
and a half months' period after conclusion of the audit) was not dis-
closed to the government. The Board found for the government using
a "natural and probable" causation test.
In the absence of any more specific evidence tending to show
what effect the nondisclosure of the pricing data had on the nego-
tiated target cost, we are of the opinion that we should adopt the
natural and probable consequence of the nondisclousre [sic] as
representing its effect. Theoretically the nondisclosure of pricing
data showing a price reduction of $20,746 should have resulted in
a reduction in the negotiated target cost of $20,746 for materials
cost plus a G&A allowance of 9.23% making a total of $22,661.
That is deemed to be the natural and probable consequence, and
there is nothing in the record to indicate that its effect was other-
wise. Accordingly, we held [sic] that the nondisclosure of significant
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and reasonably available cost and pricing data caused the negoti-
ated target price to be overstated in the sum of $22,661.39
In view of the negotiation policies and techniques followed by
DOD, which were known to [the contractor] at the time the con-
tract was negotiated, it would be a rare case indeed where there is
any better proof of direct causal relationship between the nondis-
closure and the overstatement of price. To hold that there is
insufficient proof of the causal relationship in this case would
amount to a virtual holding that there can be no entitlement to a
price reduction for nondisclosure of pricing data whenever the
contract price is negotiated under the policies and techniques
present in this case.40
Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,41 the second case dearly enunciating and
applying the "natural and probable" test, involved pricing data fur-
nished by a subcontractor. The subcontractor did not furnish either
the prime contractor or the government the latest pricing data on over
ninety per cent of the material that he had recently purchased, but he
did make records of his earlier purchases available to government
auditors and did make a gesture to the effect that all of his records were
available for inspection if desired. The subcontractor submitted his
proposal to the prime contractor in February 1962. Shortly thereafter,
he began to make substantial purchases of materials. By June, when
the material costs were finally negotiated, he had already purchased
over ninety per cent of the materials needed. The Board found that
these were excess costs, and held that the excess amount had significant
effect on the process of achieving a fair and reasonable negotiated
price within the intent of the price reduction clause. Consequently,
causation was deemed apparent; the natural and probable effect of the
failure to disclose was an increased negotiated price.4 The Board, in
fact, had little choice but to rule this way, since there was unrebutted
proof of a failure to disclose.43
Cutler-Hammer, Inc.44 neatly nails down the point that a reason-
able probability is all that is necessary for the government to satisfy its
burden of proving that defective data resulted in overstated price.
Cutler-Hammer involved the purchase of a lens from a subcontractor.
This type of lens had state-of-the-art and production difficulties which
39 Id. at 24,853 (emphasis added). See ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-5(a)(2) (1968).
40 65-2 BCA at 24,853-54.
41 67-1 BCA 29,439 (1967).
42 Id. at 29,446.
43 See Note, supra note 8, at 519.
44 67-2 BOA 29,82 (1967), appeal docketed, No. 364-67 Ct. C1.
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tended to restrict availability of sources for it. Prior to the contract in
issue, only one company manufactured the lens. After issuing a request
for quotations to five sources, Cutler-Hammer received a bid only from
its prior manufacturer in the amount of $406,445, which was included
in its price proposal to the government. Some months later, but prior
to negotiations, Cutler-Hammer received a price from an untried sup-
plier in the amount of $91,206, which was not disclosed to the govern-
ment in the negotiations. After the conclusion of negotiations, a
technical proposal was received and Cutler-Hammer subsequently made
an award to the new supplier.
In sustaining the government's claim, the Board held that any
doubt over whether disclosure of the untried and unproved quote
would have had any effect on the contract price would be resolved in
favor of the government. The reasoning was that indefinite conse-
quences fall on the one who did not disclose. The government argued
that, had it been fully advised of the facts, it would have either delayed
the execution of the contract until more data relative to the supplier's
competency became available or excluded the lens cost from the con-
tract pricing structure and reserved it for further negotiation. Although
the Board recognized that it could never be sure just what the parties
would have done if the lower price had been disclosed, it was convinced
that something contractually different would have been developed to
cover this situation. Thus the Board, after rejecting the government's
argument that it would have delayed the execution of the contract
until more data was available, concluded:
[T]he Government has established the reasonable probability that
with a disclosure of the . . . quotation, the parties would have
agreed that the cost of the [lens] would be excluded from the
contract price, and reserved for further negotiations an addition
to the contract price at a later date.45
It can be argued that in Cutler-Hammer the government did not
prove that the nondisclosure data caused an overstated price. All the
government directly proved is that it would have acted differently. It
is just as likely, however, that the contractor would not have agreed
with the government in the exercise of these alternatives. Using hind-
sight testimony as to what the parties would have done had the govern-
ment known of the undisclosed cost or pricing data, the Board is able
to speculate after the fact as to cause and effect between nondisclosed
data and the contract price. This is precisely what happened in Bell &
Howell Co.46 That case involved the nondisclosure of lower vendor
45 Id. at 29,829 (emphasis added).
46 68-1 BCA 32,335 (1968).
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quotes while Bell & Howell was actively negotiating with those vendors.
The Board noted Bell & Howell's contention "that the disclosure of the
low quotes would not have resulted in any reduction of the price below
what was agreed to ... .-47 and also considered that the government
negotiator had "conceded at the hearing that if he had known about
the low quotes, he would not have refused to consider the explanation
given by the contractor for not basing its price on the low quotes and
demanded a further price reduction .... ,,48 The Board concluded that
although disclosure would not have enabled the government to ne-
gotiate a price reduction, 49 the -government nevertheless "would not
have entered into the firm fixed price specified [in the contract modi-
fication] or any comparable figure."'50 The Board found that the
government had moved toward a firm fixed-price contract because its
evaluation of the contractor's proposal indicated that the contractor
had realistic firm prices on the purchase parts. The disclosure of the
low quotes, in the Board's opinion, and the probable discussion of
the risks attending such quotes would have persuaded the government
to conclude that there were still too many risks and contingencies to
shift to a firm fixed-price basis. Accordingly, the contractor was held
liable.
In these cases the Board's reasoning on the burden of proving
causation is subject to three criticisms: It relies upon testimony that
deals directly with a conclusion of law; it uses conjecture which does
not sustain the government's burden of proof; and it applies a subjective
test that pursued to its logical conclusion could raise the "natural and
probable" test to a rule of per se liability.51 If less than per se liability
is intended, then this test offers little or no guidance in future cases.
The use of the "natural and probable" test and its extension, the
"reasonable probability test," permits the government to succeed by
testifying, "I probably would have insisted upon a lower price." This
type of testimony, though successfully used in Cutler-Hammer and
Bell & Howell, begs the very question of causation. Traditionally, a
witness' testimony as to a legal conclusion, since it usurps the fact-
finder's function, will be excluded. 52 Yet this type of testimony forms
the foundation for the government's case under the Board's test.
47 Id. at 32,348.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 32,349.
50 Id.
51 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-5(a)(2) (1968), as amended, Defense Procurement Circ.
No. 66 (Jan. 2, 1969), 8 CCH Gov'T CONT. REP. 79,115 at 75,165-66 (1969), rejects the
idea that the government need prove that it would have acted differently. Rather the
regulation attempts to create an unwarranted form of per se liability.-
52 7 J. WIGuoRE, Evmwca §§ 1918, 1952 (2d ed. 1940).
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Arguably, such self-serving testimony is not sufficient to support
the government's burden of proof under the Act. International Har-
vester Co. v. United States53 dealt squarely with the question of the
government's right to obtain a price reduction under a contract clause
authorizing a price adjustment and treated the sufficiency of such
testimony to support the government's burden of proof. International
Harvester sued to recover $1.7 million from the United States. One of
the questions before the Court of Claims was whether the government,
if it had known certain facts, would have instituted price redetermina-
tion proceedings, pursuant to the contract terms. The government in
July 1953 asked International Harvester and other competitors to bid
on a forthcoming contract award for trucks. It was understood that the
winner of the contract award would be the government's sole manu-
facturer. Price was the most important consideration in awarding the
contract. International Harvester was willing, if necessary, to assume
a loss if it was the successful bidder. Accordingly, it prepared its bid
on a "specific cost basis," reducing in its bid certain indirect costs,
but not disclosing the manner of cost computation to the government
at the time of the award, although it was requested to do so. The
United States contended on this issue that, had International Har-
vester set forth the components of its price in its bid proposals or had
it made such data available to the government's price analyst, down-
ward and forward price redetermination would have occurred, resulting
in a contract price reduction of $490,533.08.
In words that are directly applicable to our discussion, the Court
of Claims held:
The crux of the matter is that defendant is required to prove
that it would have requested or required negotiations for price
redetermination had the actual basis upon which the bid was first
computed been known. This requirement is not met by the testi-
mony of defendant's price analyst that had he known the actual
facts, he would have recommended price redetermination proceed-
ings. Defendant's failure to meet this burden of proof leaves us to
mere speculation as to whether or how much defendant was dam-
aged by plaintiff's withholding information from defendant, and
by its misrepresentations in the cost data submitted with its bid.54
Looking at the Board decisions on causation on a case by case
basis, a rationale can be supplied to mute some of this criticism.
American Bosch Arma should be accepted as a proper application of
the "natural and probable" consequences test. Cutler-Hammer, Loch-
53 169 Ct. Cl. 821 (1965).
54 Id. at 847.
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heed Aircraft, and Bell & Howell should be limited to the proposition
that the government's burden of proof will be lightened where there
is unrebutted proof of a failure to disclose facts which are peculiarly
in the possession of the contractor, and the contractor affirmatively
acts upon those facts after the negotiations.5 5 This is the factual pattern
common to these three decisions. In each case vendor material prices,
albeit speculative, were actively considered by the contractor, but not
disclosed during negotiations.
If, however, the Board intends to create a standard of "liability
per se" upon proof of a failure to disclose, it clearly has exceeded that
point in time and space where legal causation does occur. Causation is
an explicit requirement of the Act. A rule is needed that meshes with
the objectives of the Act and, at the same time, provides predictable
results, by establishing a consistent burden of proof. If the government
does indeed bear the burden of proof as to causation, a failure to dis-
close is not some evidence of an overstated price. The specific factors
to be examined are whether there was a natural and continuous se-
quence between cause and effect. Was one a substantial factor in
producing the other?56 Testimony as to what might have happened or
testimony about modifying a method of negotiation should be im-
material. This test would not place an unfair burden on the govern-
ment because the Board could look to two pivotal events: Whether an
unearned profit exists; and whether data exists that would have a
meaningful relationship to cost or price analysis. If the Act was passed
because alleged overpricing led to windfall profits, there should be no
objection to the cause and effect being established in this manner.57
55 But Cutler-Hammer, unless reversed, should probably be confined to its special
facts because factual cost or pricing data was not present in that case, and direct causa-
tion was not proved.
56 A generally accepted rule for determining legal cause is as follows:
The proximate cause, involved as it may be with many other causes, must be at
the least, something without which the event would not happen. The court must
ask itself whether there was a natural and continuous sequence between cause
and effect. Was the one a substantial factor in producing the other? Was there a
direct connection between them, without too many intervening causes? Is the
effect of cause on result not too attentuated? [sic] Is the cause likely, in the usual
judgment of mankind, to produce the result? Or by the exercise of prudent fore-
sight could the result be foreseen? Is the result too remote from the cause,
and here we consider remoteness in time and space....
Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 354, 162 N.E. 99, 104 (1928) (dissenting opinion)
(emphasis added).
57 The government has assumed that if an agreed price includes amounts which can
conceivably be attributed to erroneous or incomplete cost or pricing data, it is not a fair
price and the resultant profits are not earned profits. Yet former Secretary of Defense
Clifford in his letter of June 13, 1968, to Senator Russell, Congressmen Rivers and Mahon,
offers data that casts doubt upon the assumption that windfall profits exist, thus providing
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So, too, emphasis should be placed upon the ability of a reasonable and
prudent person to employ the data alleged not to have been disclosed
for the purposes of cost or price analysis. To the extent the data is not
suitable for this purpose and its use is solely a matter of opinion, it
should be given little weight.
III
THE CONTRAcroR's CASE
The Act's varied conditions bestow upon contractors several
arguments that may rightfully defeat the government's claim. Although
some support for the suggestion that the government should be required to prove direct
causation. He states:
A misunderstood and misinterpreted profit statistic which has been discussed
recently is the negotiated "going-in" profit on noncompetitive contracts. Some
people apparently assume that this profit is a guarantee of what the contractor
will actually earn when the contract is completed. This is not the case.... IT]he
contractor's profit percentage can be expected to decrease to the extent that his
actual costs are higher than negotiated at the outset-a very frequent occurrence
on development and initial production of complex military items.
Furthermore, by law and regulation there are many contractor costs which
are not allowed on Government work and which thus must be paid by the con-
tractor out of his profits. These unallowable costs include interest on borrowed
capital, donations and contributions, advertising, and others; in the aggregate such
unallowables average in excess of 1.5% of the contractor's actual costs.
The statement has been made that since 1964 "going-in" negotiated profits
have increased 25% over the 1959-1963 period. The actual increase from January
1, 1964 through December 31, 1967 has been 22%. A principal reason for this in-
crease in "going-in" profit rates is the fact that we have consistently increased the
use of firm-fixed-price and incentive type contracts, while reducing the use of
cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts. This shifts responsibility and risk from the
Government to the contractor, and provides an incentive for better management.
Our experience shows that the total cost to the Government is thereby reduced.
Hence, it is sound practice to share the cost savings with the contractor.
Since 1961 the percent of awards based on firm-fixed-price contracts has in-
creased from 31.5% to 56.3% of all awards; incentive contracts have increased from
14.4% to 26.1%; while the percent of CPFF awards has dropped from 36.6% to
10.4%. We would indeed be exacting unreasonable penalties if such dramatic
shifts in risk were not accompanied by improved profit opportunities. As a con-
sequence, the average negotiated "going-in" profit has increased from 7.7%, on
estimated cost, to 9A% since January 1964-a 22% increase.
Despite this apparent improvement in profit opportunities, the limited data
available to us thus far on completed contracts show no improvement in realized
profits-that is, they are remaining at the 1959-1963 level. We are currently ex-
amining why the anticipated improvement has not occurred, because we cannot
properly expect industry to accept greater risks, and to apply an ever larger
share of their own financial resources to the performance of complex military
undertakings, without a valid opportunity to obtain profit results commensurate
with the lower cost to the Government. Unless such improvements do occur in the
future, we can only expect strong pressures to revert to much greater use of CPFF
type contracts. I am sure that you will agree, as I find industry leaders do, that
this would be a retrogressive step.
Defense Procurement Circ. No. 62 (July 10, 1968), 8 CCH Gov'T CONT. REE. 79,134 at
75,142 (1968).
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the discussion may not be inclusive of all possible positions, there are
several important contentions that should be considered. 58 First, the
contractor may have disclosed to the government the cost or pricing
data that is the subject of the dispute. Second, the nondisclosed infor-
mation may be lacking the characteristics of cost or pricing data, and
thus be properly classified as judgmental or speculative in nature.
Third, the government may have elected that only pricing data or only
cost data would be furnished to it in the negotiations and should not
be able to retreat to a position it rejected earlier. Fourth, the con-
tractor's nondisclosure may not have caused an overstatement in con-
tract price because the government did not rely upon the contractor's
cost or pricing data. Fifth, the contractor should be able to offset
asserted understatements of costs against alleged overstatements. Fi-
nally, the contractor's omission may be the result of an honest mistake.
A. The Contractor's Disclosure of Cost or Pricing Data
A determination that cost or pricing data was furnished to the
government by the contractor will, obviously, satisfy the Act's require-
ments and defeat the government's complaint. The disclosure may be
a disclosure of a body of information to a government representative or
it may take the form of a "constructive" disclosure; that is, the govern-
ment should have known that cost or pricing data existed. The principle
supporting the "constructive" disclosure of cost or pricing data is that
both sides have obligations under the Act.
In American Bosch Arma a disclosure of cost or pricing data
occurred when the contractor made available to the government
auditor all make-or-buy records used in the preparation of its proposal.
The auditor furnished an audit report of his findings to the govern-
ment negotiating team. The Board concluded that "anything that
could be found from examination of appellant's records up to [the
audit's completion date] was disclosed to the Government." 59 The
Board reached the same conclusion in Defense Electronics:60
When the contractor made data available to the Government
auditor for his use in auditing the contractor's change order price
proposal, that was a sufficient furnishing of such data for the pur-
poses of the Price Reduction clause, and the contractor was under
no obligation to furnish to the contracting officer personally data
58 The Act calls for a reduction in price when the price has been increased by "any
significant sums." This problem is not considered here because the Board has tended
to consider the amounts in the cases before it as significant. A good discussion is found
in Comment, The "Truth-in-Negotiating" Clause of P.L. 87-653 as Interpreted by the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 13 ViLL. L. REv. 604, 616 (1968).
59 65-2 BCA 24,838, at 24,851 (1965).
60 66-1 BCA 26,191, motion for reconsideration denied, 66-1 BOA 26,426 (1966).
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not requested by the contracting officer which the contractor had
already made available to the Government auditor and which the
auditor had used and referred to in the audit report which was
furnished to the contracting officer.61
In Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,62 however, the Board rejected the
contractor's contention that its responsibilities under the price reduc-
tion clause were satisfied because its pertinent records were available
to the government. The Board explained that a meaningful disclosure
required the contractor to place before the government the actual
body of data used to support its proposal:
We do not have before us a situation where a subcontractor during
negotiations actually disclose [sic] for examination and review to
the prime contractor (or the respondent) the numerous purchase
orders for material already purchased.6 3
The Board in Lockheed Aircraft distinguished American Bosch
Arma and Defense Electronics on the ground that the data involved
in those cases was physically examined by the government. The hold-
ing of Lockheed Aircraft is that the contractor must be sure the gov-
ernment is aware of the existence of any significant information.6 4
There is, however, no language in the Act which indicates that the
contractor should be held responsible for the government's analysis of
the data presented to it.
None of the cases has considered the question of whether the
government should have known of the existence of cost or pricing data
and had an affirmative duty to seek out such data from the contractor
61 Id. at 26,202. FMC Corp., 66-1 BCA 25,696 (1966), contains language to the effect
that pertinent data need only be made available to the government. The contractor
fulfilled the requirements of the clause on the basis of a stipulation between the parties
that:
All pertinent FMC books and records relating to the pricing of the changes
imposed by Modifications No. 2 and No. 6 were made available to these Govern-
ment personnel in connection with the negotiation of Modifications No. 137 and
No. 138.
Id. at 25,710.
62 67-1 BCA 29,439 (1967).
6a Id. at 29,446 (emphasis added).
64 The gesture allegedly made to Lockheed or to the Air Force that all records
were available was practically meaningless absent any inkling that such specific,
significant data was in reality present and available.
Id. (emphasis added). Compare this statement with the argument that the only thing
necessary, both before and after enactment of the bill, is for GAO to discharge its
statutory duty to inspect the books and records of contractors and subcontractors under
negotiated procurements with limited or no competition. McClelland, Negotiated Pro-
curement and the Rule of Law: The Fiasco of Public Law 87-653, 32 FoRDHAU L. Rv.
411, 412-13, 441 (1964).
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based upon such notice. 65 Nevertheless, government's accepting such a
duty in prior contracts, or government's stationing personnel at the
contractor's plant may give rise to this circumstance. The Board gave
little weight to the latter position in FMC Corp.,6  where it said that
the mere presence at the contractor's plant of a staff of fifty govern-
ment personnel did not mean they were aware of every transaction in
which the contractor was involved. 7 Although this is an accurate
conclusion, knowledge may be imputed to the government where it
has had sufficient control of prior transactions and enough contact with
the contractor to inquire into the existence of data.68 Although it may
be urged that this places a difficult burden on the government, it
would appear to be no less than the burden already borne by the
contractor who, to protect himself, must make available for "examina-
tion and review" the required information. Indeed, we may inquire
whether the Act's intent would be negated if the disclosure obligation
rested solely with the contractor and the government had no burden of
inquiry based upon imputed knowledge in situations involving a prior
course of conduct.
B., The Limits on the Contractor's Disclosure Obligation
The Board has uniformly held that the definition of cost or pricing
data set forth in ASPR is, in defective pricing appeals, the governing
definition of that phrase. The emphasis in the ASPR definition is upon
verifiable facts relating to the validity of costs. Not embraced by the
definition, however, is data that is speculative in nature or is an estimate
or judgment. The distinction between facts and judgment was neatly
summarized by the Board in Defense Electronics:
For the purpose of the defective pricing data statute and regu-
lations, "cost or pricing data" is defined by ASPR 3-807.3(e) as
"that portion of the contractor's submission which is factual".
[sic] The duty to disclose is satisfied when all FACTS reasonably
available to the contractor which might reasonably be expected to
affect the negotiated price are accurately disclosed. ASPR 3-807.1
65 The government has interpreted the Act as requiring on its part greater emphasis
in the area of cost and price analysis. See ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-2 (1968). 47 COMP. GaN.
336,544 (1967) notes that:
The legislative history of Public Law 87-653 discloses that one of its primary pur-
poses was to require full, complete and accurate data and disclosure by both
parties.
66 66-1 BCA 25,696 (1966).
67 Id. at 25,704.
68 39 Am. Jum. Notice and Notices § 12 (1942) states:
[W]hatever fairly puts a person on inquiry is sufficient notice where the means of
knowledge are at hand; and if he omits to inquire, he is then chargeable with
all the facts which, by a proper inquiry, he might have ascertained.
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[sic] (e). Cost or pricing data includes such factual matters as ven-
dor quotations and "all facts which can reasonably be expected
to contribute to sound estimates of future costs". [sic] Being fac-
tual, it is the type of information that can be verified. It does not
apply to or make representations as to the accuracy of the contrac-
tor's judgment in estimating future costs. A dear distinction is
drawn between "facts" and "judgment".[sic]69
Even though the Board's decisions are not uniform, the rule to be
derived is that data, to fall within the embrace of the pricing certificate,
means cost or pricing data which constitute a meaningful component
of the contractor's proposed costs and which may be objectively checked
for their accuracy. This definition is in accord with the ASPR require-
ments which hold that cost or pricing data include more than historical
accounting data. Falling within the scope of the definition are vendor
quotations, non-recurring costs, changes in production methods and
production or procurement volume, unit cost trends such as those as-
sociated with labor efficiency, and make-or-buy decisions or any other
management decisions which could reasonably be expected to have
significant bearing on costs under the proposed contract. The definition
has limitations in that cost or pricing data, being factual, is that type of
information which can be verified. It does not include representations
of the contractor's judgment as to the estimated portion of future costs
or projections. 70
That vendor quotations are cost or pricing data is no longer open
to question; ASPR and five Board cases have accepted this result. Yet
a firm conclusion cannot be drawn that would permit the statement of
an inflexible rule. In Sparton Corp.71 the Board considered the question
of a materials list that contained quoted prices in excess of prices offered
to the contractor by a supplier who was untried, but who later received
the subcontract work. The Board found that the intention to switch to
the new supplier was not made until after award. Under these circum-
stances the Board concluded that to hold the contractor liable the
omitted data must "reasonably be expected to have a significant
bearing" on contract costs. 72 The Board added that "the Government
does not prove its case unless it shows that the contractor, at the time
the data is submitted, did not intend to deal with the vendor listed,
but did intend to do business with the lower cost vendor. '73 In Bell &
69 66-1 BOA at 26,203-04 (emphasis added).
70 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-3(e) (1968).
71 67-2 BCA 30,373 (1967), aff'd on motion for reconsideration, 68-1 BOA 31,167 (1967).




Howell Co.,74 however, the government succeeded in its argument
that vendor quotes to untried vendors were cost or pricing data which
should have been furnished. The point of distinction, as in Cutler-
Hammer, Inc.,75 is that Bell &c Howell was actively and vigorously en-
gaged in negotiating with and making plant surveys of the vendors who
had submitted the low quotes, and that it was probable that the con-
tractor would place orders for the parts with those vendors.
The government enlarges the definition of cost or pricing data
while the contractor attempts to restrict it. Thus the cases recognize
that cancellation clauses, 76 scrap prices,77 and the cost of tests78 are
cost or pricing data. Moreover, the Board's holding in Cutler-Hammer
can be interpreted to mean that any time a contractor has any data
which might be significant from the standpoint of overall contract
negotiations, he must disclose this data to the government. 79 This re-
sult, however, when subjected to analysis does not seem to follow
from the words of the Act.80 In Cutler-Hammer the contractor failed
to disclose a quotation for components of a highly complex airborne
reconnaissance system. The quotation was significantly lower than
that used in negotiations, and the contractor admitted that the lower
quotation was purposely withheld from the government. The contrac-
tor contended, however, that disclosure would have had no effect on
the negotiated price since the quotation was from an untried vendor
and since production difficulties were to be anticipated because of in-
dustry unfamiliarity with the particular components.
Cutler-Hammer presented two special facts to the Board. First,
the data was purposely withheld by the contractor. Second, the con-
74 68-1 BCA 32,335 (1968).
75 67-2 BCA 29,822 (1967).
76 Defense Electronics Inc., 66-1 BCA 26,191 (1966).
77 FMC Corp., 66-1 BCA 25,696 (1966).
78 Radio Eng'r. Labs., 67-2 BCA 20,071 (1967).
70 Defense Procurement Circ. No. 66 (Jan. 2, 1969), 8 CCH Gov'r CONT. REP. 79,115,
at 75,064 (1969), amending ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-3(e) (1968), adopts this test.
80 If our analysis is correct the Board or a court would not be bound by the ASPR
definition:
The general proposition is that regulations promulgated pursuant to statu-
tory authority which are consistent with the statutory purposes and intent have
the force and effect of law, Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942);
Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 US. 187 (1956); California Comm'n v. United
States, 355 US. 534, 542 (1958); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 867 U.S. 886, 890
(1961); Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 250-55 (1963); and United States v.
Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 371 U.S. 285, 288-293 (1963). If the definition were
regarded as instructional rather than an implementation of law it would not be
binding. Cf. G. L. Christian and Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418; recon-
sidered July 12, 1963, 320 F.2d 345, cert. den. 375 US. 954.
ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-3(e) (1968).
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tractor intended to pursue negotiations with the untried supplier. It
is clear the lower-cost supplier's original price quotation did not con-
stitute cost or pricing data upon which a price reduction could have
been negotiated. Even at the completion of the negotiations there was
no way to measure the supplier's competence. Thus the supplier's
quotation in Cutler-Hammer should not have been considered cost or
pricing data.s1
The Board's definition of cost or pricing data when combined with
its interpretation of the natural and probable causation test creates an
unwarranted form of strict liability. The Board should find whether
the nondisclosed data is factual cost or pricing data and then should
determine if the nondisclosure directly caused an overstatement in
price. The Board in Cutler-Hammer seems to rule that if the nondis-
closed data might cause an increase in price, such data must be cost or
pricing data.82 It is doubtful that this was the result intended by the
Act.
The Board has not articulated any sure guide for the future; and
it probably cannot do so because each set of facts will have its own
nuances to shift the scales one way or another. But the Board has held
that information on experiments in process is not cost or pricing data
in a fixed-price contract, 83 that a subcontractor's labor estimates are not
considered factual data, 4 and that vendor quotes from untried suppliers
are not cost or pricing data if the contractor does not intend to do
business with that supplier.8 5
A possible way to handle this dilemma is to recognize that, while
the word "data" has a very broad meaning, it is nevertheless modified
by the phrase "cost or pricing." Under the well-known rule of construc-
tion, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the word data should be
limited by the phrase "cost or pricing."86 Thus it is possible to suggest
81 In Cutler-Hammer, the Board commented:
[A]t the time of contract negotiations (13-19 Feb. 64), and again on the date of
execution of the . . . Certificate (26 Feb. 64), the Transco quotation was far from
being data upon which a firm price reduction could be reached ... [but] the
information was significant from the standpoint of over-all contract negotiation.
67-2 BCA 29,822, at 29,828. The Board appears to equate defective cost or pricing data
with the nondisclosure of any data.
82 Id. at 29,829.
83 FMC Corp., 66-1 BCA 25,696 (1966).
84 Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 67-1 BCA 29,439 (1967).
85 Sparton Corp., 67-2 BCA 30,373, aff'd on motion for reconsideration, 68-1 BOA
31,167 (1967).
86 "Cost or pricing data" is the enumeration of a particular kind of data, thus ex-
cluding other data. See Manners v. Morosco, 258 F. 557, 560 (2d Cir. 1919), rev'd on other
grounds, 252 U.S. 317 (1920).
In FMC Corp., the Board said it was an "all inclusive concept," but only to "future
production capacity, estimates of future production capacity, future efficiency as affected
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two rules to handle this problem of definition. The first rule would
recognize that a particular kind of data is involved, namely, that which
involves only cost or pricing information. The second rule would be
that, as the ASPR suggests, the data be verifiable and factual, that is,
measurable in the arena of cost or price analysis and fact rather than
opinion. At this point, if the data involved meets these tests, a separate
requirement from the limitation on data, the causation test, should be
applied.
C. The Effect of Election by the Contracting Officer
"Cost or pricing data" as set forth in the Act is in the disjunctive,
thus indicating that either cost or pricing data, or both, may be fur-
nished.87 The consequence of this construction is that the contractor
is free to bargain only for the submission of one kind of data, or the
government, exercising its judgment, may require the submission of
only one kind of data. After the furnishing of cost or pricing data, but
not both, the government should be bound by its election as to the
kind of data to be furnished and should not be able to claim, after the
fact, that defective data was furnished to it in the negotiations. Suppose
the government and the contractor agree either for reasons of practi-
cality or the reliability of data that in their negotiations they will use
historical pricing data as to the cost of an item of material. Later, of
course, it is found that the contractor had received and did not furnish
a lower price quotation concerning this material. The contractor's de-
fense would be that since an election had been made as to which data
will be furnished, the government should be bound by its election,
with the result that the contractor is discharged from furnishing cost
data. With this lesson in mind, it would be prudent to expect the gov-
ernment in its negotiations to call for both cost and pricing data.
When this question is presented to the Board, however, a ruling
may be made that the word "or" should be read as "and." The text of
the Act, as well as its legislative history, as a whole, makes it clear that
the reference to "cost" was not intended to exclude pricing factors
other than cost. The Senate Report stated:
In determining the price under many types of negotiated con-
tracts the Government must rely, at least in part, on cost and pric-
ing data submitted by the contractor or his subcontractor.88
by learning curves . . . if they affect the work." 66-1 BCA 25,696, at 25,700. They con-
cluded, however, experiments in process were not cost or pricing data.
87 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov't Oper., 90th Cong., Ist
Sess., at 91 (1968).
88 S. Rt'. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962).
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But the draftsmen were well aware of the existing pricing procedures
established by ASPR setting forth the methods to be used by the gov-
ernment in negotiating prices. The regulations explained that:
The extent to which any particular method, or combination of
methods [cost or price analysis], should be used will depend upon
the judgment of the contracting officer.89
It would follow that the flexibility accorded the government
prior to the Act's enactment in negotiating contract prices by calling
for either cost or pricing data was not intended to be affected by the
Act merely because cost or pricing data is phrased in the disjunctive.
Even if the word "or" in the Act should be read as "and," the inescap-
able conclusion is that the contractor did not cause an overstatement
in price, since agreement had been reached that only one kind of data
would be furnished.
D. The Effect of Lack of Reliance
To establish causation the government must prove that it relied
on the action of the contractor with regard to the defective data. In
this instance the contractor has available to him several important
arguments. Since the government, in the normal course of preparing
for the price negotiations, conducts its own investigations into the va-
lidity of the contractor's proposals, it should be held to all the conse-
quences flowing from it including any overstatement in price. Second,
the manner in which the negotiations were conducted may indicate that
the government did not rely on the contractor's cost or pricing data.
When the parties deal on a lump sum basis it would appear that the
contract price is the result of bargaining, obtained without regard to
the components of cost (cost or pricing data). This would mean that
the contractor's nondisclosure did not cause a price overstatement.
It is established legal doctrine that where a party makes his own
independent investigation and then relies on his own knowledge or
judgment, he cannot fault the representation of the other party, even
if those representations are inaccurate. 90 If there is sufficient opportu-
nity for examining the real facts when his attention is directed to the
sources of information, and he commences, or purports to commence,
an investigation, simple notions of expediency and of justice require
that he be charged with all the knowledge which he might have
89 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-1 (1961) (emphasis added).
90 Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Klaffenbach, 40 F.2d 899, 903 (9th Cir.
1930); In re Bowen, 58 F. Supp. 286, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1944); Mahaffey v. Ferguson, 156 Pa.
156, 168, 27 A. 21, 22 (1893).
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obtained had he pursued the inquiry with diligence and completeness.
Yet this argument has not been adequately analyzed by the Board.
Where the Board has considered the effect of the government's inves-
tigation, the Board has often found that the government has not relied
exclusively on its own investigations91-- a finding that conflicts with
general legal principles.92 Although this principle seemingly places
the government in the quandary of choosing between conducting an
independent analysis and losing its claim,93 as a practical matter, the
government must conduct its own analysis of the contractor's proposals.
And the effective use of-the Act requires both that this be done vigor-
ously and that the government assume responsibility for its conduct.9 4
Where the data is not reasonably available to it, then the govern-
ment did rely on the contractor's representation. Thus, owing to the
sequence of events in Cutler-Hammer, the government should probably
not be held to any investigation it may have conducted, since it could
not reasonably have learned of the quotation from an untried supplier.
And the lower quotations from the untried supplier in Bell & Howell
may merit the same conclusion. Suppose, however, that the govern-
ment in Bell & Howell, despite its ignorance of the lower quotation,
could analyze Bell & Howell's proposal and determine that it should
be able to procure the items at a lower price. The government, then,
enters the negotiations On this assumption. In the absence of any
decisions on this situation, we could only guess at the result. But a
strong argument could be made for the government's lack of reliance.
Moreover, lack of reliance is almost inherent in the negotiation
process.9 5 In negotiating the price for its contracts, the government
ordinarily is concerned with the reasonableness of the overall contract
91 See American Bosch Arma Corp., 65-2 BCA 24,838 (1965).
92 Hackleman v. Lyman, 50 Cal. App. 323, 326, 195 P. 263, 264 (1920):
If a purchaser of real estate visits the property prior to the sale and makes a
personal examination of it, touching representations made as to its quality,
character, or condition, he will be presumed to rely, not upon the representations,
but upon his own judgment in making the purchase, provided the vendor does
nothing to prevent his investigation being as full as he chooses.
Shappirio v. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1904):
When the means of knowledge are open and at hand; or furnished to the pur-
chaser or his agent and no effort is made to prevent the party from using them,
and especially where the purchaser undertakes examination for himself, he will
not be heard to say that he has been deceived to his injury by the misrepresenta-
tions of the vendor.
The same rule is also applied in the law of sales. 46 AM. Jun. Sales § 105 (1943).
93 Braemer, Recent Developments in Government Contract Law, 22 Bus. LAw. 1057,
1069 (1967).
94 See Comment, supra note 58, at 613.
95 See 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRAGrs § 579, at 413 (1960).
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price rather than reaching agreement on each individual cost element
that may be involved.96 These negotiations, like most business trans-
actions, thrive on give and take, perception and judgment. Yet the
total price negotiated is only as sound and equitable as the individual
cost elements that make up the total price. Nevertheless, the govern-
ment generally deals on a total cost basis, trading offers and counter-
offers until a price is hammered out. The difficulty of this approach in
relation to price adjustments under the Act was discussed by the Board
in American Bosch Arma:
This case illustrates the difficulty of establishing that nondis-
closure of pricing data concerning a specific cost element caused
an increase in the negotiated total price when there was no agree-
ment or understanding with respect to specific cost elements.97
Accordingly, under the government's negotiation technique, a
price concluded on a lump sum basis leaves significant elements of
cost unresolved. The government may believe that the reduction
negotiated from the contractor's proposed price pertained to specific
individual cost elements which it had questioned. However, the con-
tractor may have understood that the negotiations were concluded on
an entirely different basis. Later, when the government claims defective
pricing, the contractor should be able to prevail since there was no
reliance on his proposal-the contract price was not based on any
specific agreement on cost elements.98 Although the Board noted this
position in FMC Corp.,99 the cases at this time suggest that the use of
the total cost method, by itself, may not defeat the government's claim.
The Board has been torn between the circumstances presented to it
for decision, and the recognition that treating lump sum negotiations
as an intervening cause will defeat the legislative purpose. Conversely,
it may be urged that the total cost method of negotiation does break
the chain of causation. The government is free to negotiate price agree-
ments on the components of cost. Having selected the method of
negotiation, it should not be free to insist upon a price reduction if
96 American Bosch Arma Corp., 65-2 BCA 24,838, at 24,847 (1965). See also Defense
Procurement Circ. No. 22 (Jan. 29, 1965).
97 65-2 BCA 24,838, at 24,852-53 (1965).
98 Id. at 24,847.
99 Thus, the method of negotiation is immaterial, as long as the evidence shows
that the Government relied upon data furnished to it, or negotiated a price in
the absence of data which should have been furnished to it within the context of
the applicable clause. However, method of negotiation may become significant in
determining whether the Government did in fact rely upon the data furnished
or would have relied upon absent data in reaching agreement on price.
FMC Corp., 66-1 BCA 25,696, at 25,699 (1966) (emphasis added).
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hindsight shows a basis for price reduction. All that can be said at the
moment, however, is that total cost or lump sum negotiations increases
the government's burden of proof. In combination with other facts
showing nonreliance, the contractor can use total cost negotiations in
support of the theory that the government's position is inequitable
since its lump sum bargaining technique compensated for an overstate-
ment in price.
E. The Offset Problem
A strict reading of the Act suggests that the price adjustment pro-
visions provide for only price reductions. If the government insists on
a price reduction because the contractor has overstated cost figures, the
government should agree to a price increase where the contractor has
understated cost figures. That is, the contractor's losses from cost un-
derestimation would first be offset against its gains from cost overesti-
mation. Offsets in this case may be used in either or both of two
senses: offsets within the same item of cost or offsets for any item of
cost which was understated.
The question of offsets was presented to the Board in Cutler-Ham-
mer. The omitted costs were related to the overstated costs, in that both
were concerned with the same general cost area of purchases from
third parties. The omitted costs would have increased the target cost.
The Board rejected the proposition that the Act contemplated offsetting
one cost with another, indicating that other remedies were available
to contractors for the correction of mistakes:
In this regard we have not overlooked the fact that these remedies
may be more restrictive than the corresponding remedy of the
Government under the Defective Pricing procedure. The simple
answer to this is that both the statute and the contractual provision
which it implements, literally limit the adjustment to pricing de-
ficiencies which tend to overstate the contract price.100
The Board's explanation is not, however, entirely convincing.
There is no reason to conclude that the Act was intended to distinguish
between favorable and unfavorable mistakes, with the contractor being
confined to a previously established remedy. But the Board held that
the Act, on this point, must be strictly construed:
As such we would need to be shown a clear Congressional intent
that all cost and pricing deficiencies, regardless of their nature or
direction, were correctable under the statute before we could grant
that relief here. On this point we must, of course, recognize that
100 Cutler-Hammer Inc., 67-2 BCA 29,822, at 29,826 (1967).
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there is some indication in the legislative history that the result
which we here reach may not have been intended. By the same
token there is just as much, if not more, evidence that such was the
Congressional purpose. As a consequence we cannot say that the
Congressional purpose in this regard is conclusively evident one
way or the other. We are therefore constrained to adopt a literal
interpretation of the statute, and, if we err, it is for others, be it the
Congress or the courts, to set the matter right.101
We may indeed fault the Board for its attempt at statutory anal-
ysis. The better approach would have been to examine the words of
the Act. It speaks only of price adjustments "to exclude any significant
sum by which ... the price was increased." The Board should have
considered the problem of offsets on the basis of the inclusion in the
negotiated price of "a significant sum." It is suggested that the word
"significant" in the Act permits consideration of the degree of the price
overstatement. If so, then the Board should allow such offsets because
the Act should permit an analysis of the significance of the price in-
crease.1 12
The use of offsets is at least supported by the argument of fairness.
Assuming that a contractor makes two honest errors, is there a valid
reason why the government should take advantage of one and ignore
the other? The government's rebuttal to this is that it should not be
expected to act as an insurer of the contractor against his own mistakes
in furnishing data concerning his own costs. 10 3 Yet, the Board's holding
in Cutler-Hammer does not eliminate the possible exception that
arises when the overstated cost or pricing data is so closely connected
with the understated data that it would be impractical to consider the
one without the other. 04
Recently the Defense Department agreed to limited offsets in two
situations: (1) When the accuracy of an item, which is an average rate,
is questioned, overstatements in making up the rate may be set off by
LOL Id. at 29,826-27. One note writer suggests that the Board was wrong in its reading
of the legislative history. See Comment, supra note 58, at 618-19.
102 Roback, supra note 1, at 26-27, noted the Department of Defense and General
Accounting Office objections to offsets. Their theory is that, by not permitting offsets, the
Act encourages contractors to use extra care in submitting proper information, while an
offset privilege would have the reverse effect. He noted that offsets could have the effect
of encouraging contractors to deliberately understate costs hoping to reprice them during
contract performance. This position assumes that a contractor will defectively price a
contract in two ways: first, by overstating costs in violation of the pricing certificate; and
second, by understating costs to diminish a government defective pricing claim. This
seems unlikely.
103 Id. at 26.
104 Defense Procurement Circ. No. 57 (Nov. 80, 1967).
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the understatements; and (2) overstatements and understatements re-
lating to the same item can be offset against each other. However, offsets
are allowed only if the net adjustment is downward.
The Department should also permit offsets where the contractor
demonstrates that some items have been unintentionally overstated,
while closely related items have been inadvertently understated.
F. Overstatements in Price and Honest Mistakes
Under the Act the contractor certifies the suitability of the cost
or pricing data to the best of his knowledge or belief. This limitation
was introduced by industry representatives who questioned the practical
enforcement of a statute which was unqualified in its terms.10 5 The cost
or pricing data that may exist in a large industrial organization for the
purpose of pricing a government contract may be difficult to as-
semble.10 6 It is practically impossible, in large contracts, to foresee all
the costs that may be incurred; therefore, cost information is not always
complete and a large portion of it must necessarily be estimated. 0 7
Thus an unqualified certification is simply unrealistic.
Senator Symington was sensitive to this problem and noted Mr.
Vinson's suggestion that liability would not arise if the contractor had
made an honest mistake. The colloquy is instructive:
Senator SYMINGTON. You had better read the testimony of
Mr. Vinson given this committee. His suggestion does not say you
are guilty of anything if you make an honest mistake. It simply says,
as I understand it, that you give the best estimate you have of what
your costs will be before the incentive contract is set.
Mr. OLVERSON. I am not sure that the provision in the bill
says that; it says "cost data," and it doesn't use the word "estimate."
And in developing the testimony here that is one of the
things-
Senator SYMINGTON. Then would you be satisfied if it said,
"To the best of the knowledge of the company"?
Mr. OLVERSON. Estimated costs to the best of the knowledge
of the company would certainly make it a much better provision.
Senator SYMINGTON. If you gave cost data you would give
the best cost data you had at the time. A statement was wanted
that this was the best knowledge available. And they shouldn't be
punished if they made an honest mistake, only if they deliberately
set a high figure.
Would you furnish some language along those lines you think
would be applicable?
105 Hearings, supra note 3, at 95.
106 Id. at 43.
107 Id. at 95.
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Mr. OLVERSON. Certainly. We would be glad to try, sir.
And that is the basis of our position, that the language of the
present bill would almost make a contractor certify concerning
facts which he just wouldn't know about. Cost is something tangi-
ble, and it is difficult for a contractor to predict what his costs are
going to be.
Senator SYMINGTON. All right.108
Although this discussion would support the view that, under the
pricing certificate, the contractor would not be liable for an honest
mistake, representatives of the Department of Defense took the position
that a statutory right existed to reduce the price because the price
adjustment provisions of the Act did not hinge on the qualification of
"knowledge and belief" set forth in the pricing certificate. The liability
imposed on a contractor was said not to pivot on intent or knowl-
edge.109
Even though this interpretation is supported by the notion that
a contractor should not receive a profit based on defective cost or
pricing data where he had the responsibility of submitting correct
data at the time the price was negotiated, the harshness of this view
compels closer examination. We have postulated elsewhere in this
article that the pricing certificate and price reduction clause are tied
together to form a single document." 0 Liability under the price re-
duction clause should turn on the pricing certificate. On this basis, then,
it would be fair to say that the legislative history of the Act planned
for an exemption for an honest mistake to be accepted in a proper
case. This view is reinforced by the provision of the Act which estab-
lishes the disclosure requirement as an affirmative obligation of the
contractor. This requirement is cast in terms of duty and the corollary
of a duty is not liability for an "honest mistake" but liability resulting
from fault or negligence. The qualification of "knowledge and belief"
is a tacit recognition that a standard of commercial reasonableness
would be observed in enforcing the statutory mandate.
IV
THE SUBCONTRACT DILEMMA
The Act confronts the prime contractor with the problem whether
he will be liable for the defective pricing of his subcontractor."' The
108 Id. at 99.
109 Id. at 62. See also Defense Contract Audit Hearings, supra note 4, at 24-25.
110 See pp. 716-18 supra.
ill Pettit, The Defective Pricing Law and Implementing Regulations-A Year and a
Half Late, 29 LAw & CoN-TMP. PROB. 552, 559 (1964).
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government has interpreted the Act to mean that it has a right to
reduce the contractor's price when a subcontractor furnished defective
cost or pricing data in connection with a subcontract where a certificate
of cost or pricing data was or should have been furnished. The focus of
the government's interpretation is that a subcontractor's cost or pricing
data forms part of the contractor's cost or pricing data and is, therefore,
covered by the contractor's certificate. 112
Traditionally, our law has been premised upon establishing lia-
bility because of the actor's fault or negligence. The burgeoning areas
of strict liability have, in the personal injury field, constituted a recog-
nized exception resulting from social forces at play in the community.
In subcontract relationships the parties deal at arms length. The basis
for prices is normally considered to be a competitive advantage, which
most businessmen would not want to disclose to those with whom
they intend to contract. Access by a contractor to a subcontractor's
books and records is an unusual procedure.118 Thus the government's
basis for holding the contractor liable for omissions on the part of his
subcontractor is unclear, if not erroneous.
So, too, government definitions of "cost or pricing data" relating to
the Act's legislative history stressed the reasonable availability of data
before assessing liability against the contractor. The critical fact is that
the contractor does not have a basis to know the subcontractor's cost or
pricing data. Congressman Hebert, a principal sponsor of the Act, has
stated that it was in part intended to enable the government during
negotiations to obtain the contractor's information, but not data the
contractor did not know:
Truth will work wonders. All this section requires is that the truth
be made known at the time of the bargaining. Who can object to
telling the truth? The argument about persons being penalized for
what they do not know is plain nonsense. The truth is nothing
more or less than what a contractor knows when he opens his
mouth. What he does not know, he does not speak. No semantical
exercise can change those values.114
Since the price reduction clause is intended to be used in conjunc-
tion with the pricing certificate, it would follow that the "knowledge
and belief" portions of the certificate confirm this analysis.
The Act undoubtedly intended to preserve the privity of contract
arrangement that is said to exist in government contracts; the prime
112 See ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7.104-29 (1968).
113 See Fromson, Government Subcontractor, 159 N.Y..J., Jan. 5, 1968, at 1 & 4,
Kurth, Selling to a Government Prime Contractor-The Contract Provisions Clause by
Clause, 23 Bus. LAw. 423, 438 (1968).
114 Hearings, supra note 3, at 57.
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contractor was to be a conduit for the recapture of amounts due sub-
contractors with a companion obligation to hold such amounts in trust
until payment was made to the government.1 15
The extremeness of this interpretation is brought home with the
recognition that it could be applied against a prime contractor because
his subcontractor had been adjudicated a bankrupt or was insolvent. 16
Until this question is resolved, the contractor must be prepared to
balance on a tightrope-at one end the government holds him responsi-
ble for the omissions of his subcontractor; at the other end the sub-
contractor is unwilling or unable to assume the burden of the govern-
ment's claim.
A possible solution to the problem, and one indirectly suggested
by the government, is to permit the subcontractor to appeal any adverse
defective pricing decision to the Board of Contract Appeals. 117
The subcontractor's dilemma, however, is one of forum-selection;
an appeal to the Board of Contract Appeals or a contractor's suit against
him in a state or federal court having jurisdiction of the subject matter.
The balance of the present factors might tip the scales in the direction
of accepting a court's determination. A Board decision may favor per
se liability against the subcontractor. Moreover, it may dismiss the
subcontractor's appeal because there is no evidence of a dispute under
the prime contract or because of the absence of a contracting officer's
decision.118 Similarly, the Board may hold there is actually no dispute
between the prime contractor and the government, thereby defeating
the subcontractor's right of appeal. This decision may result from an
agreement by a prime contractor and contracting officer on the inter-
pretation of contract clauses, and the subcontractor would be pre-
cluded from challenging this interpretation. 119
However, once the subcontractor elects a court proceeding, a
multiplicity of proceedings may occur; the contractor, to preserve his
rights, will be forced to appeal to the Board while pursuing his de-
fense before the court. 20 Unless the Board is recognized as the ex-
115 International Harvester Co. v. United States, 342 F2d 432, 437 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
But see Collins Radio Co., 67-2 BCA 29,976 (1967).
116 Pettit, supra note 111, at 559. Of course, under these circumstances the contractor
may be excused from any responsibility by operation of law.
117 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 23-203(b) (1968).
118 Howry-Berg Steel & Iron Wks., Navy BOA 4 CCH Cont. Cas. F. 50,571 (1947).
119 Florida Builders, Inc., 63 BCA 19,289 (1963).
120 Mr. Cuneo, in a speech before the Southwestern Legal Foundation Institute on
Government Contracts in Dallas on September 12, 1968, described this problem as follows:
The material facts begin with the General Accounting Office issuing a report
that the sub's data was defective. The subcontract had been executed prior to
agreement on the prime contract price.
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clusive forum for defective pricing appeals, contractors and the
government may be faced with forum shopping and multiple pro-
ceedings.121 Regardless of other defects in the Act, the possibility of
holding the contractor liable for the acts of his subcontractor is one
which leads to results not fully appreciated or understood at this time.
V
OTHER GOVERNMENTAL APPROACHES TO DEFECTrIVE PRICING
A. Withholding of Money by the Government Because of Defective
Pricing Allegations
Suppose the government under the "Disputes" clause of a contract
made a final decision to the effect that incomplete pricing data was
furnished in negotiations, and that under the contract's price reduction
clause the contractor was indebted to the government. A Change Order
which accompanied the Contracting Officer's final decision purported
to reduce the contract amount. Thereafter, on appeal a complaint is
filed with the Board, disputing the Contracting Officer's final decision
and rejecting the Change Order. However, after the appeal is filed the
government demands a refund, based upon the Contracting Officer's
decision and the Change Order. The government states that this
amount should be set off against amounts due under or from payments
due under other government contracts. The government may attempt
to fashion a remedy of this nature, but the legality of this maneuver
is questionable.
Pursuant to ASPR 3-807.5(e) the Contracting Office notified the prime of
contemplated price reduction action because of the defective sub data. Thereupon,
the prime withheld under the subcontract a sufficient sum to cover the possible
price reduction. The sub protested the withholding.
The prime offered to process an administrative appeal under its Disputes
article in its name on behalf of the sub to settle the defective data issue. However,
the sub rejected the offer for the reason, among others, that the sub did not wish
to have the issue determined by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
in light of its recent pro-Government defective decisions. The sub then sued the
prime in a state court for breach of contract.
The prime will have to defend on the basis that it was using self-help to
protect itself against the charge of defective sub data. It is expected the sub
will defend against the defective data claim that it is entitled to off-sets.
The prime has also taken an administrative appeal under its Disputes article
from a final Contracting Officer's decision alleging the Government's right to
a price reduction because of the defective sub data. The prime fears that it is in
danger of being whipsawed by contrary administrative and judicial decisions.
BNA FED. CoNT. RPM. No. 239, at A-14 (Sept. 16, 1968).
121 The Board, however, appears to have rejected this argument in Honeywell, Inc.,
68-1 BCA 31,171 (1967).
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It has become a clich6 to say that the United States has the inherent
right to set off amounts due to it against claims of contractors. 12 2 Like
most generalities the statement is too broad to be accurate. The funda-
mental rule governing the right of setoff is that it only extends to set-
offs arising out of the same transaction.123 In Burroughs Corp.,12 4 the
government asserted the right to withhold and apply monies from pay-
ments due the contractor under other government contracts. Moreover,
the government insisted on the right even though the claim was dis-
puted by means of an appeal to the Board. Professor Williston, for one,
has emphatically concluded that the governing legal principle is to the
contrary:
Where an absolute debt has arisen as the price or exchange
for some performance received by the debtor, no breach of duty
by the creditor will excuse the debtor from liability. This is true
even though there are mutual obligations which are both liqui-
dated debts. Under the common law, such debts do not extinguish
one another pro tanto, either automatically or by manifestation of
election by one party. Either agreement of the parties or judicial
action is necessary.125
It is equally true that the government may not unilaterally set off
an unliquidated claim against the contractor without its consent. In
Cornp. Gen. Decision B23802,126 the Comptroller General stated the
principle in these terms:
It is well established that as a general rule the courts will not
allow unliquidated claims to be set off and of course where the
claim is not only unliquidated at the inception of a legal action but
is not susceptible of exact determination by the court any setoff
would not be allowed.127
122 See ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 163.106-1 (1968).
123 Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1951); Castner, Curran & Bullitt,
Inc. v. United States, 5 F.2d 214, 216 (2d Cir. 1925). See also Lane, Administrative Resolu-
tion of Government Breaches, 28 FED. B.J. 199, 226-28 n.107 (1968).
124 65-2 BCA 23,970 (1965).
125 6 S. WnisroN, CONTRACrs § 887E (3d ed. 1962).
126 21 Coup. GN. 894 (1942).
127 Id. at 896. See also Climatic Rainwear Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 415 (Ct.
Cl. 1950), where suit was brought to recover a balance of money under a contract for
raincoats, and the government had set off an equivalent sum representing excess costs and
liquidated damages claimed by the United States under a prior contract:
A disputed claim for damages, for breach of contract, cannot in any sense of
the word be considered a stated account and such claim is not subject to the
control and decision of the accounting officers of the United States. As stated in
Standard Dredging Co. v. United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 218, 240-41 (1930): " * * The
reason is plain. Such claims must be sustained by extraneous proof and often
involve a broad field of investigation requiring the determination of difficult
legal questions and the application of judgment and discretion upon the measure-
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Thus, although the court decisions are to the contrary, Burroughs Corp.
suggests that the government might assert its possible right to a price
reduction by setoff of an unliquidated amount after a dispute has been
filed with the Board. 12 The government, however, should not be al-
lowed to complicate the difficult problem of equitable administration
of the Act with an objectionable remedy.
B. Attacking Defective Pricing through the False Claims Act
Under the False Claims Act,129 any person who makes a claim for
payment or approval upon or against the government knowing such
claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent is required to pay the sum of
$2,000 for each false invoice submitted, plus double the amount of dam-
ages. Although the government may attempt to cure defective pricing
by prosecuting under this Act for the submission of a false certificate,
i.e., one not reflecting changes in current pricing data occurring before
the completion of negotiations, it surely should not be allowed to
prevail.
The chief purpose of the False Claims Act was to provide restitu-
tion to the government of money taken from it by fraud. 30 In the
normal defective pricing situation, the Act is not violated by a con-
tractor's submission of an erroneous certificate because the certificate
is not a demand for money. 31 The certificate rests on an offer by the
ment of damages and the weight of conflicting evidence. * * "
* .* This account was in dispute between the parties and being thus un-
settled, it could not equitably be used to apply against a sum due and owing to
the plaintiff under the terms of Contract 14952 and the reservations made under
the termination settlement agreement.
The Government's defense of release is, therefore, overruled.
Id. at 418.
As noted by Judge Medina in the Grace Line case,
the unilateral withholding and applying of money allegedly due the United States
on a disputed claim against a creditor does not constitute payment of that credi-
tor's claim against the United States.
Grace Line, Inc. v. United States, 255 F.2d 810, 814 (2d Cir. 1958). To a similar effect are:
7 Comp. GEN. 186 (1927); 19 CoMp. GEN. 785 (1940); and 21 CoMe. GEN. 894 (1942).
128 Where it is dear, however, that the government must eventually recover, there
is authority to the effect that a setoff of monies under other contracts may not be objec-
tionable. Barry v. United States, 259 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1913). See also Gratiot v. United States,
40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 336, 370 (1841). Statutory right for setoff does exist after judgment
against the government. 31 US.C. § 227 (1964). A thoughtful comment discussing the
government's setoff rights may be found in Cuneo, Some Footings in a Quagmire:
Stabilization of Obligations and Party Positions Under Government Contracts, 37 GEo.
WASH. L. Rav. 1, 50-54 (1968).
129 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1964).
130 United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551-52, rehearing denied, 318
U.S. 799 (1943); United States v. Brethauer, 222 F. Supp. 500, 502 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
131 See United States v. Farina, 153 F. Supp. 819 (D.N.J. 1957).
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contractor to perform a service or furnish supplies at a certain price,
and since an offer alone cannot violate the Act,182 basing liability on the
certificate is clearly erroneous. Moreover, the cost figures are only esti-
mates, and in Maxwell v. United States,138 it was recognized that esti-
mates prepared for the purpose of submitting a claim under a termi-
nated defense contract did not provide the basis for finding a violation
of the Criminal False Claims Act, found in 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
Even if a contractor demands payment under a false certificate, the
False Claims Act should not be used to correct defective pricing for
three reasons: First, the parties have contractually provided for an ad-
ministrative determination for factual disputes by the Board, and a civil
fraud suit deprives the contractor of his contractual right to have facts
determined by the Board; second, the parties have contractually agreed
that damages for defective data will be at most a dollar-for-dollar reduc-
tion of the contract price, whereas civil fraud damages are double this
amount, plus perhaps as much as $2,000 per invoice; and third, since
the Truth in Negotiating Law contemplates both resolution of defec-
tive cost or pricing data issues pursuant to the usual contractual reme-
dies and a price reduction only in the amount of the defect, it is more
specific and therefore should be controlling. If the government can
proceed under the False Claims Act, it can then treat the disputes
procedure as elective in defective pricing cases, whereas the contractor
must follow this procedure under pain of losing all rights under the
contract.
Nevertheless, the court in United States v. Honeywell, Inc.134 re-
jected the contractor's assertion that the Truth in Negotiating Law was
the exclusive government remedy in defective pricing cases,135 and sub-
sequently, in the contractor's separate appeal to the Board, the Board
declined jurisdiction.36 Thus the government is free to pursue either
remedy and is able to pyramid its remedies in an unhealthy manner.
Since the purpose of the Truth in Negotiating Law was to enable the
government to achieve lower prices through increased accuracy of cost
and pricing data, while the False Claims Act was intended "to reach
any person who knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay
claims grounded in fraud . . . ,13 applying the latter act to defective
pricing disregards the scope and function of the pricing certificate. 38
132 Id. at 821-22.
133 277 F.2d 481, 502 (6th Cir. 1960).
184 Civil No. 67-181 (M.D. Fla., filed May 1, 1967).
135 Defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied on Jan. 29, 1968.
136 Note 121 supra.
137 United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544 (1943).




The Act is an uncontrolled arrow in the government's quiver.
Proceeding from a misconception, fed by unreality, "Truth in Negotiat-
ing" emerges as a slogan without substance. Confusion arises from the
uncertain meanings growing out of the phrase "cost or pricing data,"
and the Act's relationship with other laws. Hindsight and subjectivity
surround the tests for causation. The lines surrounding thie burden of
proof waver. The light that supposedly emanates from the distinction
between the availability of data and the disclosure of data is not con-
stant. Experience under the Act teaches us that it is uneven in quality.
Imperfect laws are a basis for injustice.
Proper analysis of a defective pricing case proceeds from the
premise that the price reduction clause and pricing certificate are a
single document. Contractual rather than statutory rules of interpreta-
tion must be applied. At the outset a determination must be made
whether the nondisclosed information is cost or pricing data. The ad-
ministration of the Act would be improved if "cost or pricing data"
was not considered an all-embracing phrase. The term should not be
defined by what its significance may have been during negotiations.
Instead, "cost or pricing data" should be considered as an arithmetical
fact capable of being subject to cost or price analysis. By its very nature
cost or pricing data should be subject to the rule of reason. The nega-
tive aspect of certain information should be used as a test to place such
data beyond the disclosure requirements.
Having determined that cost or pricing data is present, the Board
or court should insist that causation be proved. Causation should be
viewed as a continuous flow of events in which certainties, not prob-
abilities, are relevant. The government, too, must be held to have
responsibilities under the Act. It should be held to a duty of inquiry to
seek out data suggested by the facts and circumstances of a particular
negotiation. In this way, there is assurance that the Act will have a
vigorous application.
Under this analysis, the government's burden of proof does not
become the subject of fluctuating interpretations. And the basic con-
cept of equity and fair dealing should be employed to sanction offsets
of inadvertently understated and overstated cost or pricing data. Lia-
bility by the prime contractor for a subcontractor's cost or pricing data
is clearly beyond the terms of the pricing certificate where the prime
contractor does not know of the existence of such data. Furthermore,
it is harsh and mistaken to use the Act as a basis for the offsetting of
accounts on other contracts after a dispute has arisen. To avoid con-
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fusion in procurement law, "Truth in Negotiating" must be confined
to its own sphere. The pricing certificate is not the knowing submission
of a claim against the government for payment or approval of money,
and hence should not be the basis for an alleged violation of the Civil
False Claims Act.
Legislative reconsideration of the Act could take many forms.
Many of the matters previously discussed could be incorporated into a
revised statute, including a reciprocal obligation on the government's
part to disclose equivalent data. Other options, however, are available
to the Congress. The entire subject could be considered as part of the
proceedings under the Renegotiation Act. Alternatively, separate profit
limitations could be passed for fixed price type contracts, although such
restrictions would be inconsistent with the incentive features of such
contracts. What the passage of the Act discloses, however, is an implicit
criticism of the manner in which industry and government prepare
proposals and positions to negotiate contract prices. Further study, ob-
jectively pursued, may point the way to improved negotiating practices
so that the Act's requirements could be dispensed with or considered
hortatory.
